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IS LAW A DISCIPLINE? 
FORAYS INTO ACADEMIC CULTURE   
 
GENE R. SHREVE 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores academic culture. It addresses the reluctance in academic 
circles to accord law the full stature of a discipline. It forms doubts that have been 
raised into a series of four criticisms. Each attacks an academic feature of law, inviting 
the question: Is law different from the rest of the university in a way damaging its 
stature as an academic discipline? The Article concludes that, upon careful 
examination of each criticism, none establishes a difference between law and other 
disciplines capable of damaging law’s stature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Robert Paul Wolff wrote that “all professional schools and professional degree-
granting programs should be driven out of the university.”1 Thorstein Veblen was 
more specific. “[T]he law school belongs in the modern university no more than a 
school of fencing or dancing,” Veblen wrote. “This is particularly true,” he added, “of 
the American law schools.”2   
Veblen and Wolff were not alone in questioning law’s place in the university.3 The 
chorus of doubt has grown and includes the voices of a disturbing number of academic 
lawyers. These doubts and their consequences will be the subject of Part One.  
Part Two examines three attacks made against law as an academic discipline: 
preferential university treatment, trade-school commercialism, and the conceptual 
disarray of legal scholarship. Part Three examines a fourth attack: law’s publication 
of articles without peer review. This Article concludes that there is no difference 
between law and other disciplines capable of damaging law’s stature as an academic 
discipline. 
I. PART ONE: THE PROBLEM 
A. Nonacceptance of Law as an Academic Discipline
George Priest wrote that it is becoming “difficult . . . to justify whether law is a 
subject worthy of study at all.”4 Others noted attacks on academic lawyers as 
“interlopers in the university,”5 as “not really academic . . . an appendage to the 
university world,”6 and as sharing little more than “the same zip code.”7 They are seen 
to comprise “a parasitic discipline,”8 with “no meaning except that which it absorbs 
 
1 ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, THE IDEAL OF THE UNIVERSITY 12 (1970). 
2 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 155 (Cosimo Inc. 2005) (1918). 
Veblen was as usual ahead of the curve. It took time for his negative opinion of law schools to 
gather force. 
3 As a rule, I will use the term “university” to refer generically to four-year institutions of 
higher education. Burton Clark reviewed terminological approaches (e.g. “university” as 
opposed to “college”), concluding that “[t]here is no one best way to define the boundaries.” 
BURTON R. CLARK, THE ACADEMIC LIFE–SMALL WORLDS, DIFFERENT WORLDS 21 (1987).   
4 George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as 
University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437, 438 (1983).  
5  Finn Makela, Is Law an Academic Discipline?, 50 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 433, 437 
(2016). Despite similar titles, Makela’s article, Dagan’s article (infra note 9), and this article are 
quite dissimilar in content.  
6 TONY BECHER, ACADEMIC TRIBES AND TERRITORIES – INTELLECTUAL ENQUIRY AND THE 
CULTURES OF DISCIPLINES 30 (1989). 
7 Paul A. Samuelson, The Convergence of the Law School and the University, in The American 
Scholar 256, 258 (1975) (“[T]he predominant notion others in the university have of academic 
lawyers is that they are not really academic.”). JANET GAIL DONALD, The Commons–
Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Encounters, in THE UNIVERSITY AND ITS DISCIPLINES: 
TEACHING AND LEARNING WITHIN AND BEYOND DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARIES (Carolin Kreber ed., 
2009).  
8 Anthony Bradney, Law as a Parasitic Discipline, 25 J. L. & SOC’Y 71, 71 (1998). 
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from other disciplines.”9 The legal academy “faces a serious disciplinary challenge,”10 
an “existential crisis,”11 a “profound crisis of identity.”12
Legal scholarship underpins law’s claim as an academic discipline. Assessments 
here are also troubling. “For the rest of the university,” wrote Robin West, “legal 
scholarship is . . . lacking in any real—meaning academic—discipline.”13 Legal 
academics have called most legal scholarship “essentially atheoretical,”14 leaving 
“little or no trace.”15 An intellectually-ambitious scholarly attempt often leads to 
“unimportance altogether,”16 yielding “yet another clever, perhaps thoughtful, but 
nonetheless utterly failed contribution.”17 Legal scholars grapple with “the 
displacement and disintegration of the prevailing legalist creed.”18 To Edward Rubin, 
the “conceptual disarray of legal scholarship has become so familiar to us that we have 
ceased to regret it.”19 He saw “a serious question whether legal scholarship constitutes 
a discipline at all.”20  
B. Disappointment and Self-Doubt In The Legal Academy 
Wolff’s caustic recommendation has not come about and is unlikely to do so. 
Academic animus has not dislodged law schools from universities, but it has damaged 
the image of the legal academy, diminished law professors’ self-esteem, and restricted 
them from reaching their full potential as scholars.21 
 
9 Hanoch Dagan, Law as an Academic Discipline, in Stateless Law: Evolving Boundaries of 
the Discipline 43 (Helge Dedek & Shauna Van Praagh eds., Routledge 2015).  
10 Id. 
11 Justin McCrary et al., The Ph.D. Rises in American Law Schools, 1960-2011: What Does 
It Mean for Legal Education?, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 543, 543 (2016). 
12 Stephen M. Feldman, The Transformation of an American Discipline: Law Professors in 
the Past or Future (or Toy Story Too), 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 471, 471 (2004). 
13 ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW – JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF 
PROFESSIONALISM 8 (2014). 
14 Priest, supra note 4, at 439. 
15 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 56 (2012). 
16 Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World 
Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 61 (2009). 
17 Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 167 (1990). 
18 Mark Galanter & Mark Alan Edwards, Introduction: The Path of the Law Ands, 1997 
WISCONSIN L. REV. 375, 376. John Henry Schlegel, Searching for Archimedes–Legal 
Education, Scholarship, and Liberal Ideology, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103, 103 (1984) (“[L]egal 
scholarship can best be described as an open scandal.”).  
19 Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process: The Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1343 (1996). 
20 Edward L. Rubin, Legal Scholarship, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 562 (Dennis Patterson ed., Blackwell 1996). 
21 MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS–HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 108 (1994). 
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Those entering the legal academy from practice (still a majority22) usually do so 
with high expectations. They are drawn by attractions including flexibility, 
independence, and intellectual prestige.23 This lifestyle appears increasingly attractive 
by comparison as traditions of legal practice continue to deteriorate.24 William 
Sullivan noted: “The result of the conjunction of an increase in the supply of lawyers 
with a more competitive marketplace for legal services has been a desperate scramble 
for livelihood.”25 Cutthroat work environments, where lawyers “fear . . . being 
blindsided by competitors, adversaries, and even colleagues,”26 have become 
commonplace. The result is a “growing sense of demoralization in legal practice.”27 It 
is unclear how or whether conditions will improve.28  
These concerns influence decisions to leave law practice for the academy,29 but 
academic life is seen as more than a means of escape. A stronger reason exists for 
joining a law faculty: the opportunity for a life of the mind.30  
Granted, questions arising in the practitioner’s work could inspire intellectual 
curiosity and serve as points of departure for profound thought. The problem, to 
paraphrase Richard Hofstadter, “is not in the character of the ideas with which” the 
lawyer “works but in his attitude toward them.”31 Lawyers are tied to the partisan 
interests of their clients. The question guiding their preparation is not “what is the right 
result under the law?” It is instead “what is right under the law about what my client 
wants?” Lawyers have no choice. They are ethically required to be advocates. “As an 
advocate,” Anthony Kronman stated, “a lawyer . . . does not–cannot–show any . . . 
ambivalence or uncertainty about the client’s position.”32 There is instead a rhetorical 
 
22 Beginning law professors with a Ph.D. from another discipline – an increasing number 
(McCrary, supra note 11), but still a minority – are less likely to have practiced. 
23 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY–THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF 
PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA 11–12 (2d ed. 2005). 
24 Id. at 6. 
25 Id. at 5–6. Neil Gross, American Academe and the Knowledge–Politics Problem, in THE 
AMERICAN ACADEMIC PROFESSION TRANSFORMATION IN CONTEMPORARY HIGHER EDUCATION 
111 (Joseph C. Hermanowicz ed., 2011).  
26 GLENDON, supra note 21. 
27 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS – PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION 
OF LAW 127 (2007). 
28 For bleak assessments, see STEVEN J. HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE–A PROFESSION IN 
CRISIS (2013); BRUCE MACEWEN, GROWTH IS DEAD: NOW WHAT?–LAW FIRMS ON THE BRINK 
(2013); Robert W. Gordon, The Legal Profession, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., Cornell University Press 2002); and MICHAEL H. TROTTER, PROFIT & 
THE PRACTICE OF LAW–WHAT’S HAPPENED TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION? (1997). 
29 See RICHARD  L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS vii (1989). 
30 Id. 
31 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 27 (1962). 
32 ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER–FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 146 
(1993). In contrast, “because of the economic independence of position that an academic faculty 
appointment confers, a law teacher is not charged with attempting to advocate a client’s position 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss2/7
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duty to extol any plausible33 case–however weak–that the client may have. Only the 
judge is entitled to place law above the self-interest of the parties.34 
In theory and often in practice, this arrangement works well. Called the adversary 
system, it provides the judge with an efficient means for locating the strongest 
arguments for each side.35 Yet, despite professional triumphs and comfortable 
incomes, some lawyers find the role incomplete. They chafe at the notion of law as an 
indiscriminate tool for gratifying client needs. They see law instead as a source of 
intellectual wonder, alive with possibilities for improving society. They yearn for “the 
sheer satisfaction that comes from pursuing knowledge on subjects that the scholar 
finds interesting and important,”36 for the chance to become “intellectuals of the 
law.”37 They imagine a place where they would be free to explore the farthest reaches 
of law, to learn, and to share their knowledge: the university.38 
Universities invite such aspirations. They offer, in the words of Alfred North 
Whitehead, an “atmosphere of excitement, arising from imaginative consideration” 
that “transforms knowledge.”39 He continued: “A fact is no longer a bare fact: it is 
invested with all its possibilities. It is no longer a burden on the memory: it is 
energizing as the poet of our dreams, and as the architect of our purposes.”40  
Many of those joining law faculties desire and expect full membership in this 
exciting community,41 only to be snubbed or ignored by those from other disciplines. 
Sadly, this has led legal academics to engage in prolonged self-doubt.42 It is important 
 
or with generating immediately usable and saleable results.” David E. Van Zandt, Discipline-
Based Faculty, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332, 333 (2003).  
33 A lawyer may not assume positions in court that are implausible in the sense that they are 
legally ungrounded or devoid of factual support. See GENE R. SHREVE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 233–36 (2013). 
34 “An advocate is the representative of one particular interest in actual or potential conflict 
with others, and it is not his duty to define the collective well-being of those involved or to 
determine how it can be achieved.” KRONMAN, supra note 32, at 147. William Simon similarly 
observed: “The lawyer is expected to represent people who seek his help regardless of his 
opinion of the justice of their ends,” adding “whenever he takes a case, he is not considered 
responsible for his clients purposes.” William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural 
Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36 (1978). 
35 Simon, supra note 34, at 37. 
36 DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE–SCHOLARS, STATUS, AND ACADEMIC 
CULTURE 33 (2006). 
37 David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Brokers: Three Fundamental Roles of 
Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 127, 132 (1988). 
38 Id. at 176. 
39 ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, THE AIMS OF EDUCATION AND OTHER ESSAYS 93 (Free Press 
1967) (1929). 
40 Id. 
41 See generally FIONA COWNIE, LEGAL ACADEMICS–CULTURE AND IDENTITIES (2004); 
FRANCIS A. ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION (1979). 
42  Priest, supra note 4, at 439. 
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here to distinguish self-doubt from self-questioning. The latter asks what are we? Self-
questioning provides disciplines the means for crucial introspection about their 
purposes, research methodologies, and knowledge claims. Such conversations within 
a discipline may become heated.43 Charges of disloyalty to the discipline may be flung 
about, but none questions the discipline’s existence. On that there is social and 
institutional solidarity.44 Disciplines wish to appear as healthy and important as 
possible. To universities, to public and private grant-funding institutions, and to 
academic publishers, the message is that their discipline is, and will remain, on solid 
academic ground.45   
What sets law apart is the extent to which the discipline questions whether it is. 
The legal academy continues to entertain serious discussion on the question of its own 
legitimacy.46 American legal scholars have recognized numerous doubts about law’s 
stature as an academic discipline.47 This places them in sharp contrast to members of 
other disciplines who “rarely interrogate their own institutional practices, preferring 
self-promotion to self-criticism.”48  
 
43 See, e.g., DAVID M. RICCI, THE TRAGEDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1984); ANNE 
HENDERSHOT, THE POLITICS OF DEVIANCE (2002) (sociology); QUESTIONING GEOGRAPHY: 
FUNDAMENTAL DEBATES (Noel Castree et al. eds., 2005); THE INSTITUTION OF PHILOSOPHY: A 
DISCIPLINE IN CRISIS? (Avner Cohen & Marcelo Dascal eds., 1989); THE CRISIS IN ECONOMIC 
THEORY (Daniel Bell & Irving Kristol eds., 1981). 
44 Historically, disciplinary “development was not simply an organic consequence of 
advances in knowledge, but was also the product of institutional and societal factors.” JOE 
MORAN, INTERDISCIPLINARITY 12 (2d ed. 2010). 
45  Rob Kelly, Advice for Department Chairs: Six Steps for Building a Healthy Department, 
FACULTY FOCUS (Sept. 17, 2013), https://www facultyfocus.com/articles/academic-
leadership/advice-for-department-chairs-six-steps-for-building-a-healthy-department/. 
46 Feldman, supra note 12. 
47 See Bradney, supra note 8; Roger C. Cramton, “The Most Remarkable Institution”: The 
American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1986); Feldman, supra note 12; Galanter & 
Edwards, supra note 18; PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999); McCrary et al., supra note 11; James Lindgren, An Author’s 
Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Priest, supra note 4; Rubin, supra note 20; Schlag, 
supra note 17; TAMANAHA, supra note 15; WEST, supra note 13.  
The picture seems much the same in Britain, where law faculty exhibit a “tendency towards 
self-denigration.” BECHER, supra note 6, at 30. There is “a noticeable lack of intellectual self-
confidence” within the British legal academy. COWNIE, supra note 41, at 198. 
Many law professors as a consequence refrain from encounters with those from other 
university disciplines. It is more reassuring for them to define themselves by insular, law-school 
standards. For example, a recent American Bar Foundation study found that “[t]he vast majority 
of [law] professors reported feeling respected and comfortable in their teaching positions, with 
96% feeling respected by students and 98% feeling comfortable in the classroom.” AM. BAR 
FOUND., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2018). 
48 CARY NELSON & STEPHEN WATT, ACADEMIC KEYWORDS: A DEVIL’S DICTIONARY FOR 
HIGHER EDUCATION 107 (1999). For disciplines, “[t]he quest for status is a pervasive feature of 
academic life” Tony Becher, The Counter-Culture of Specialization, 25 EUR. J. EDUC. 333, 339 
(1990). This has proven an inviting target for critique and parody. See, e.g., JAMES HYNES, THE 
LECTURER’S TALE (2001); HEINZ EULAU, THE POLITICS OF ACADEMIC CULTURE: FOIBLES, 
FABLES, AND FACTS (1998); DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLD: AN ACADEMIC ROMANCE (Penguin 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss2/7
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In short, self-doubt – even self-denigration – weakens the ability of the legal 
academy to be taken or to take itself seriously.49 It erodes law professors’ intellectual 
self-confidence and stifles their scholarly ambition. The register of academic doubt in 
and beyond the legal academy over the legitimacy of law as a discipline is probably 
stronger now than at any earlier time. It shows no signs of abating.  
Such are the circumstances that occasion this Article. Let us now turn to the 
grounds for questioning law as an academic discipline.  
II. PART TWO: THREE ATTACKS THAT FAIL 
A. Does Law Receive Preferential University Treatment? 
Is the legal academy a victim of disciplinary jealousy? 
To be clear, law faculty have found some members of other disciplines to be 
congenial and supportive. Through the Law and Society Association, other 
organizations, or informal encounters, social science and humanities scholars have 
viewed academic lawyers as equals and even as collaborators.50  
Still, academics are capable of viewing their disciplinary neighbors unkindly. For 
example, Tony Becher noted in his study of faculties and their interactions that 
botanists were thought by others to be “not necessarily the brightest,” and as “people 
who hide behind herbarium cases and hate one another.”51 Interdisciplinary friction is 
common,52 fueled by what Marjorie Garber termed “discipline envy.”53  
Law schools have been a source of irritation because, as other academics see it, 
they are coddled by universities.54 A distinguished former law school dean candidly 
observed: “We’ve managed, broadly speaking, to assure the highest faculty salary 
 
Books 1995) (1984); F. M. CORNFORD, MICROCOSMOGRAPHIA ACADEMICA: BEING A GUIDE FOR 
THE YOUNG ACADEMIC POLITICIAN (Bowes & Bowes 1964) (1908); KINGSLEY AMIS, LUCKY 
JIM (Penguin Books USA 1976) (1954); HAZARD ADAMS, THE ACADEMIC TRIBES (2d ed. 1988). 
A rich cultural study of academics and their disciplines appears in PIERRE BOURDIEU, HOMO 
ACADEMICUS (Peter Collier trans., Stanford University Press 1988) (1984). 
49 Even smaller signs are painful: For example, the suggestion that it takes the addition of 
Ph.D.s for a law faculty to become “discipline-based.” See Van Zandt, supra note 32; Lynn M. 
LoPucki, Dawn of Discipline-Based Law Faculty, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506 (2016). 
50 Examples of collaboration include Cheryl R. Kaiser & Victor D. Quintanilla, Access to 
Counsel: Psychological Science Can Improve the Promise of Civil Rights Enforcement, 1 POL’Y 
INSIGHTS BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 95 (2014); Steve J. Sherman & Joseph L. Hoffman, The 
Psychology and Law of Voluntary Manslaughter: What Can Psychology Tell Us About the 
“Heat of Passion” Defense?, 20 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 499 (2007); William M. O’Barr & 
John M. Conley, The Culture of Capital: An Anthropological Investigation of Institutional 
Investment, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 823 (1992). 
51 BECHER, supra note 6, at 30. 
52 See, e.g., JERRY A. JACOBS, IN DEFENSE OF DISCIPLINES: INTERDISCIPLINARITY AND 
SPECIALIZATION IN THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY 13 (2013); MORAN, supra note 44, at 168; 
ANDREW ABBOT, CHAOS OF DISCIPLINES 137 (2001); ADAMS, supra note 48, at 64–65. 
53 MARJORIE GARBER, ACADEMIC INSTINCTS 53 (2001).  
54 James P. White, Legal Education in the Era of Change: Law School Autonomy, 1987 DUKE 
L.J. 292, 303–04 (1987). 
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levels, or at least among the very highest, in the academy.”55 The resulting envy and 
resentment by lesser-paid academics could easily jaundice their views about the place 
of law schools in universities. 
Yet, even if pay equity belongs in an assessment of law as an academic discipline, 
the issue may become moot. Salaries for law professors are almost certain to decline, 
narrowing the gap. The trend has begun.56 It is occurring for two reasons. First, as the 
backgrounds of law professors increasingly resemble those of professors in the social 
sciences or humanities, it becomes more difficult to justify paying law professors 
more. Once, law professors were hired almost entirely from the distinguished ranks of 
the legal profession. To entice such persons to forgo the handsome financial rewards 
a continued law practice would have provided, universities usually placed law 
professors at or near the top of their salary scales.57  
Recently however, hiring interests among elite law schools and others have shifted 
to candidates with Ph.D.s in political science, economics, history, or some other 
field.58 Ph.D.s make up close to 40% of faculty recently hired at some law schools.59 
Such candidates may have law degrees but are usually uninterested in law practice. 
For them, the alternative to a law school appointment would be an appointment 
elsewhere in the university. These persons forgo no financial advantage by choosing 
the law-school job; therefore, the reason for paying them more disappears. Ph.D. hires 
may advance law schools’ interdisciplinary teaching and research missions, but they 
undercut the argument for high salaries. 
The second reason law-faculty salaries will decline is more sobering. The 
prosperity that American legal education long enjoyed is fast disappearing.60 Once, 
law schools were more than self-supporting, covering their own expenses and creating 
surpluses which their universities were happy to siphon off.61 Universities were 
impressed and grateful, rewarding law faculty with salaries among its most generous.62 
Now everything is changing. As Robin West observed: “The American legal academy 
is in a world of trouble.”63  
 
55 Gene R. Nichol, Rankings, Economic Challenge, and the Future of Legal Education, 61 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 345, 345 (2012). See Van Zandt, supra note 32, at 334 (“noting that academic 
lawyers are paid “substantially more on average than our colleagues in other departments.”). 
56 See WEST, supra note 13, at 175. 
57 George C. Christie, The Recruitment of Law Faculty, 1987 DUKE L.J. 306, 306 (1987). 
58 McCrary, supra note 11, at 545; Wayne S. Hyatt, A Lawyer’s Lament: Law Schools and the 
Profession of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 385, 388 (2007). 
59 McCrary et al., supra note 11, at 545. LoPucki, supra note 49, at 507 (“[T]he overall trend 
remains unmistakable. Ph.D. hiring is increasing rapidly.”). 
60 James Huffman, Law Schools: Reform or Go Bust, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://www.newsweek.com/law-schools-reform-or-go-bust-308339. 
61 Herbert M. Kritzer, Law Schools and the Continuing Growth of the Legal Profession, 3 
OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 450 (2013). 
62 Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM  177, 196 
(2012). 
63 WEST, supra note 13, at 1. 
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Legal education is approaching a state of financial crisis.64 Economically 
vulnerable law schools have suffered the most, but the future is troubling for all but 
the most elite.65 The prospect of lower salaries is only one of the worries facing law 
professors. Others include increased teaching loads, decreased research support, 
layoffs, and the collapse of their institutions.66  
The problem is that a nation-wide drop in law school applications has caused a 
sharp dip in enrollments,67 with a corresponding loss of tuition dollars. “An iron law 
governs law school finances,” wrote Brian Tamanaha, “expenses must be paid for by 
the number of students multiplied by tuition.”68 Many potential applicants are avoiding 
law schools. Already burdened by undergraduate loan debt,69 they are unwilling to 
assume the additional debt necessary for law school tuition when the legal job market 
remains uncertain.”70 
These difficult circumstances have altered the relationship between law schools 
and their universities. Once benefactors, a growing number of law schools now need 
 
64 Huffman, supra note 60, at 2. 
65 TAMANAHA, supra note 15, at 132–34. 
66 See Gregg Toppo, Why You Might Want to Think Twice Before Going to Law School, USA 
TODAY (June 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com /story/news/2017/06/28/law-schools-
hunkering-down-enrollment-slips/4302130 01/; Debra Cassens Weiss, Law School Faculty 
Numbers Shrink 11 Percent Since 2010; Which Schools Shed the Most Full-Timers?, A.B.A. J. 
(Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_school_faculty_numbers_shrink_11_percent_sin
ce_2010_which_schools_shed; Kathryn Flagg, The Trials of Vermont Law School, SEVEN DAYS 
(Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.sevendaysvt.com/vermont/the-trials-of-vermont-law-
school/Content?oid=2435029; Alicia Albertson, New England Law Downsizing Enrollment, 
Faculty Size, THE NAT’L JURIST (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www nationaljurist.com/prelaw/new-
england-law-downsizing-enrollment-faculty-size.  
67 See Peter Schworm, Waning Ranks at Law Schools, BOSTON GLOBE (July 6, 2014), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/07/05/law-school-enrollment-fails-rebound-after-
recession-local-colleges-make-cuts/fR7dYqwBsrOeXPbS9ibqtN/story.html; Mark Hansen, 
Law School Enrollment Down 11 Percent this Year Over Last Year, 24 Percent Over 3 years, 
Data Shows, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 17, 2013), 
www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_school_enrollment_down_11_percent_this_year_over
_last_year_data_shows; Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 15, 2012), https://www nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-existential-crisis-
for-law-schools html. 
68 See TAMANAHA, supra note 15, at 63; AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 47 (“Most law schools 
are heavily tuition-dependent for operating revenue.”). 
69 See Drew Desilver, In Time for Graduation Season, a Look at Student Debt, PEW RES. CTR. 
(May 12, 2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/13/in-time-for-graduation-
season-a-look-at-student-debt/. 
70 See Karen Sloan, Starting Salaries Continue to Slide as Big Firm Opportunities Dry Up, 
NAT’L L.J. (July 12, 2012), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202562736465&/; William Henderson, The 
Hard Business Problems Facing U.S. Law Faculty, LEGAL TIMES (Oct. 31, 2011), 
https://legaltimes.typepad.com/lawschoolreview/2011/10/the-hard-business-problems-facing-
us-law-faculty.html.  
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extra financial assistance to cover budget shortfalls.71 Universities are likely to 
condition such assistance on acceptance by law faculties of cost-cutting measures, 
including a freeze or reduction of faculty salaries.72 
In short, there is increasingly less about the financial position of the law school 
professoriat to be envious about. 
B. Is the Legal Academy Mired in Trade-School Commercialism? 
Recall the opening tirades of Robert Paul Wolff (a philosopher) and Thorstein 
Veblen (an economist) against the presence of law schools in universities. Law schools 
simply had no place in the serene environment they envisioned. Cloistered, absorbed 
in scholarly thought, academics were expected to take little notice of the outside world. 
They comprised a “self-governing community” having “little to do in a regular way 
with the larger society,” Wolff wrote, “keeping very much to its own affairs and 
judging its activities by the internal norms of scholarship rather than by social norms 
or productivity and usefulness.”73  
In contrast, these critics thought law faculties were tainted by their involvement 
with the outside world.74 They could not “commit themselves or their energies to the 
university unconditionally, as professors in the arts and sciences regularly do.”75 
Critics believed that law faculties were mired in a commercial, trade-school culture.76 
Instead of producing scholars, they produced lawyers – a dubious contribution to 
society.77 Their attempts at scholarship were, as a result, inconsequential.78  
These contrasting images of the university and of the law school were widespread, 
and they persist today.79 If the images were ever accurate, they are no longer. 
Stanley Aronowitz observed that universities today are “[f]ar from the image of an 
ivory tower where, monk like, scholars ponder the stars and other distant things.”80 In 
this vein, Margaret Thornton noted: “While the idea of the university as a community 
 
71 Jack Crittenden, The End of Independent Law Schools?, 28 THE NAT’L JURIST 1,  4. 
72 Patricia Yollin & Jim Doyle, Budget Squeeze Hits Hard at Public Universities, S.F. CHRON., 
Jan. 10, 2009, at B1. 
73 WOLFF, supra note 1, at 7. 
74 Id. at 13. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 12. 
77 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 1 (1977) (“In most societies at most periods 
the legal profession has been heartily disliked by non-lawyers.”). See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 226 (3d ed. 2005); FRANCES KAHN ZEMANS & 
VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 3 (1981); Perry Miller, 
Introduction, in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA–FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 17 
(Perry Miller ed., 1962). 
78 BECHER, supra note 6, at 30 (“[S]cholarly activities” of academic lawyers “are thought to 
be unexciting and uncreative, comprising a series of intellectual puzzles scattered among large 
areas of description.”). 
79 See WEST, supra note 13, at 8. 
80 STANLEY ARONOWITZ, THE KNOWLEDGE FACTORY: DISMANTLING THE CORPORATE 
UNIVERSITY AND CREATING TRUE HIGHER LEARNING 11 (2000). 
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of scholars engaged in the dispassionate pursuit of truth may never have accorded 
precisely with the reality, any semblance of the idea now seems to have gone 
forever.”81      
To begin with, universities cannot begin to absorb into their professorial ranks as 
many of the Ph.D.s as they produce.82 “In fields such as English, anthropology, 
history, linguistics, and physics, the job market in four-year colleges and research 
universities has shrunk to near vanishing point.”83 As a result, “[i]n almost every field 
in which one can obtain a Ph.D., studies show that a substantial number of people with 
that degree work at something other than faculty positions.”84 Acknowledging that 
many of their Ph.D.s must find work outside universities, academic disciplines provide 
training and placement assistance for non-university work.85 In this way, academic 
disciplines function like professional schools.86   
Universities have entered the outside world in a different, more fundamental way 
by embracing “education in the age of neoliberalism.”87 This development “can be 
broadly described as marketisation of higher education, i.e. restructuring its form and 
 
81 MARGARET THORNTON, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY: THE CASE OF LAW 2 (2012).  
82 See RHODE, supra note 36, at 12–13; NELSON & WATT, supra note 48, at 51. 
83 ARONOWITZ, supra note 80, at 12–13. 
84 MARY MORRIS HEIBERGER & JULIA MILLER VICK, THE ACADEMIC JOB SEARCH HANDBOOK 
195 (3d ed. 2001). 
85 Non-academic career opportunities figure prominently in the mission statements of most 
disciplines. See, e.g., Careers in Anthropology, AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
https://www.americananthro.org/AdvanceYourCareer/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1783 (last 
visited Aug. 27, 2019); Who We Are, AM. ECONOMIC ASS’N, https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2019); Career Diversity for Historians, AM. HISTORICAL ASS’N, 
https://www historians.org/jobs-and-professional-development/career-diversity-for-historians 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2019); Exploring Applied Career Options, AM. POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS’N, 
https://www.apsanet.org/careers/non-academic (last visited Aug. 17, 2019); Non-academic 
Career Opportunities in Psychology, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
https://www.apa.org/careers/resources/profiles/index (last visited Aug. 17, 2019); Members 
include:, AM. SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N, https://www.asanet.org/about-asa (last visited Aug. 17, 
2019). 
86 Skills reflected in the acquisition of a Ph.D. can impress potential employers outside the 
academy. See JOHN A. GOLDSMITH, JOHN KOMLOS & PENNY SCHINE GOLD, THE CHICAGO 
GUIDE TO YOUR ACADEMIC CAREER 223–24 (2001) (statement by John Komlos) (“Analytical 
thinking, clear writing skills, organizational talent, ability to communicate orally, and 
experience in getting along with colleagues in a bureaucratic organization are as useful in 
government service, the nonprofit sector, and in research organizations as they are in the 
business world.”).  
87 William Deresiewicz, The Neoliberal Arts: How College Sold its Soul to the Market, 
HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Sept. 2015, at 25–26; DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2007) (“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”). 
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content according to market models.”88 Often it seems that “[o]nly the commercial 
purpose now survives as a recognized value.”89 Universities have become 
entrepreneurs.90 
The spread of neoliberalism in higher education is global.91 Its features include 
power shifts from faculties to university bureaucracies,92 commodification of 
learning,93 treatment of students and their parents as consumers,94 preferential 
treatment for professors who can attract corporate funding,95 and replacement of full-
time faculty with part-time adjuncts.96 Institutions of higher education are thus 
becoming corporate universities.97 Resulting “corporate values and corporate thinking 
are inexorably replacing the values and logic that once defined the liberal arts.”98   
All of the commentators noted here have understandably lamented the neoliberal 
turn in higher education. But it is immaterial to the present discussion whether 
neoliberalism is good or bad for higher education. What matters is that, even were we 
to assume that law schools are tainted by commercialism, that would not set them apart 
from universities. “Academic and corporate America are so intertwined,” wrote 
Cynthia Crossen, “that it would take a huge effort to separate the two, if it could be 
done at all.”99  
Moreover, whether university law schools were ever driven by commercialism is 
open to question. The legal academy’s distinguished academic provenance is often 
 
88 Les Levidow, Neoliberal Agendas for Higher Education, in NEOLIBERALISM: A 
CRITICAL READER 156, 161 (Alfredo Saad Filho & Deborah Johnson eds., 2005). 
89 Deresiewicz, supra note 87, at 26. 
90 HANS RADDER, THE COMMODIFICATION OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH 6 (2010); Gross, supra 
note 25, at 112. 
91 THORNTON, supra note 81; Levidow, supra note 88. 
92 BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE FALL OF THE FACULTY: THE RISE OF THE ALL-ADMINISTRATIVE 
UNIVERSITY AND WHY IT MATTERS 1 (2011); ARONOWITZ, supra note 80, at 62. 
93 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, NOT FOR PROFIT: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE HUMANITIES 48 
(2010); SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW 
ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER EDUCATION (2004). 
94 BILL READINGS, THE UNIVERSITY IN RUINS 11 (1996); Levidow, supra note 88, at 157. 
95 JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION xii (2005); DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE 106 (2003). 
96 NELSON & WATT, supra note 48, at 55–58; ARONOWITZ, supra note 80, at 12–13. “[A]bout 
25 percent of faculty in community colleges, four-year colleges, and universities were part-time 
employees at the end of the 1970s. By the end of the 1980s, one-third of the nation’s faculty 
members were employed part time. And, in 1993, . . . the number was officially 42 percent.” 
ANNETTE KOLODNY, FAILING THE FUTURE: A DEAN LOOKS AT HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 206 (1998). 
97 See MAGGIE BERG & BARBARA K. SEEBER, THE SLOW PROFESSOR: CHALLENGING THE 
CULTURE OF SPEED IN THE ACADEMY x (2016). 
98 FRANK DONOGHUE, THE LAST PROFESSORS: THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY AND THE FATE OF 
THE HUMANITIES 83 (2008). 
99 CYNTHIA CROSSEN, TAINTED TRUTH: THE MANIPULATION OF FACT IN AMERICA 229 (1994). 
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overlooked. While the social sciences did not take shape until the late 19th century,100 
law schools were part of European universities from the medieval period. “By the late 
Middle Ages, . . . the term ‘discipline’ was being applied to professions such as 
medicine, law and theology.”101 Law schools played a vital role in the institutional and 
intellectual development of these early universities.102 The school of civil law at the 
University of Bologna “became the model of university organization for Italy, Spain, 
and southern France.”103 Based on Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, study at Bologna 
“showed refinement and subtlety of legal thought analogous to that of scholastic 
philosophers,” representing to some “the most brilliant achievement of intellect of 
mediaeval Europe.”104  
The intellectual aspiration notable in this early history has persisted in the legal 
academy. Good legal scholars today are not (as academics elsewhere may believe) 
mere appendages of the legal profession. Instead, and to the frustration of some 
critics,105 they usually distance themselves from the workaday problems of lawyers 
and judges. Alfred Aman wrote that “the fundamental goal of a university law school 
is the creation of new knowledge.”106 In this vibrant academic culture, many legal 
scholars display the qualities of true intellectuals described by Richard Hofstader: 
“disinterested intelligence, generalizing power, free speculation, fresh observation, 
creative novelty, [and] radical criticism.”107  
This alone suggests a level of scholarly commitment comparable to that of other 
academic disciplines. Of added significance however is the legal academy’s 
interdisciplinary turn. “[F]ashions in legal scholarship and teaching have changed,” 
observed Paul Carrington, “as law schools have become more academic, more deeply 
and more intricately involved with other disciplines and with the universities of which 
most law schools are a part.”108 That trend demonstrates law’s intellectual curiosity 
about and solidarity with the efforts of its disciplinary neighbors. 
In short, whatever cultural or intellectual distance might have existed between 
universities and law schools is disappearing as they move toward each other. 
 
100 Liah Greenfeld, How Economics Became a Science: A Surprising Career of a Model 
Discipline, in DISCIPLINARITY AT THE FIN DE SIECLE 87 (Amanda Anderson & Joeseph Valente 
eds., 2002). 
101 MORAN, supra note 44, at 4. 
102 CHARLES HOMER HASKINS, THE RISE OF UNIVERSITIES 18 (1923). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 48–49. 
105 See Harry Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 36 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 11 (1986). RICHARD POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 
(2016). Richard Burst, The High Bench v. the Ivory Tower, 98 A.B.A. J. 50 (2012). 
106 Alfred Aman, Protecting a Space for Creativity: The Role of a Law School Dean in a 
Research University, 31 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 557 (2000). 
107 HOFSTADTER, supra note 31, at 27. 
108 Paul D. Carrington, The Dangers of the Graduate School Model, 36 J.  LEGAL EDUC. 11 
(1986). 
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Universities are involving themselves more with the outside world while law schools 
are directing more of their attention to scholarly activities within the university. 
C. Is Legal Scholarship in Conceptual Disarray? 
Edward Rubin’s earlier description of the “conceptual disarray of legal 
scholarship”109 poses a different challenge to law as an academic discipline. The best 
example of such disarray may be the furor that attended the Critical Legal Studies 
movement (CLS).110 CLS scholars (“crits”) and their detractors generated a great deal 
of legal scholarship in the late 1970s and the 1980s.     
CLS had roots in the earlier Legal Realism and Critical Theory movements. Legal 
realists had attacked the pseudo-science and complacency of legal formalism.111 Crits 
drew from the Realists their irreverence toward and abiding suspicion of legal 
institutions and traditions.112 From Critical Theory, they formed (via the New Left in 
the 1960s) the shape of their central attack on liberal legal regimes in developed 
societies.  
In Critical Theorist Herbert Marcuse “[t]he New Left found its master-
theoretician.”113 His book, One-Dimensional Man (1964), had great impact. “The 
fundamental thesis” of the book was “that the technology of advanced industrial 
societies has enabled them to eliminate conflict by assimilating all those who in earlier 
forms of social order provided either voices or forces of dissent.”114 Duxbury 
explained: “Marcuse’s message–that liberalism breeds false-consciousness, that the 
freedom which it promotes merely perpetuates capitalist domination–gave the New 
Left a greater sense of purpose.”115  
CLS “grew out of the New Left tradition.”116 There was what G. Edward White 
termed “a striking congruence”117 between the central messages of the New Left and 
CLS. Crits reintroduced the thesis of the One-Dimensional Man, wrapping it in 
adjectives like indeterminate, contradictory, incoherent, oppressive, and illegitimate. 
Crits delighted in “trashing” fundamental concepts of traditional legal theory 
including rights, freedom, progress, reason, and the rule of law. “Once trashing was 
 
109 Rubin, supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
110 Neil Duxbury provides an excellent history of CLS in NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 421–509 (1995). For an insider’s description of the movement, see 
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). 
111 Surveys of Legal Realism appear in DUXBURY, supra note 110, at 65–159; LAURA 
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–60 (1986); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN & 
THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). A representative collection of Realist scholarship appears in 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). 
112 G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual 
History 40 SOUTHWESTERN L.J. 819, 819–20 (1986). 
113 DUXBURY, supra note 110, at 431. 
114 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, HERBERT MARCUSE: AN EXPOSITION AND A POLEMIC 71 (1970). 
115 DUXBURY, supra note 110, at 432. 
116 Id. at 435. 
117 G. Edward White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STANFORD L. REV. 649 
(1984). 
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unleashed,” wrote a disgruntled observer, “it became fashionable to compete over who 
could compose the most vicious taunts or the most outlandish attack on a legal 
institution.”118  
CLS had a particularly debilitating effect on Harvard Law School. The school had 
previously led a relatively serene and magisterial existence.119 CLS turned it into a 
“war zone.”120 Crits often displayed an air of belligerence. They condemned those 
failing to embrace their views and were condemned in return. Paul Carrington, then 
Dean of the Duke University Law School, wrote in a scathing article that crits were 
nihilists who had “an ethical duty to depart the law school.”121  
CLS undoubtedly plunged the legal academy into a tumultuous period. Did that 
challenge the discipline’s existence? It helps, in answering this question, to take a 
broader look at academic culture.  
Academic disciplines enjoy prerogatives of intellectual skepticism that have 
antecedents in Western antiquity, thereafter “purified, and constantly renewed” by the 
Enlightenment.122 Unfortunately, academics involved in debate often “substitute 
contempt for argument.”123 They become polemicists, writing “not to persuade but to 
stiffen the spines of their supporters and irritate the stomach linings of their 
enemies.”124  
Acrimony among academics is legendary.125 “Throughout history,” wrote Steven 
Pinker, academic “battles of opinion have been waged by noisy moralizing, 
demonizing, hyperbole, and worse.”126 Departmental politics, jealousies, and 
 
118 ARTHUR AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: OUTSIDERS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER LEGAL 
EDUCATION 86 (1998). 
119 Cf. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL: 1817-1917 (1918); ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY 
OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967 (1967). 
120 Laura Kalman, The Dark Ages, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE 
TERCENTENNIAL LECTURES 206 (Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004). A vivid description of events 
appears in ELEANOR KERLOW, POISONED IVY: HOW EGOS, IDEOLOGY, AND POWER POLITICS 
ALMOST RUINED HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1994). 
121 Carrington, supra note 108, at 227. 
122 PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION: THE RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM 
127 (2d prtg. 1967). 
123 Eugene Goodheart, Reflections on the Culture Wars, in THE AMERICAN ACADEMIC 
PROFESSION 155 (Stephen R. Graubard ed., 2001). Thomas Kuhn lamented “the talking-
through-each-other that regularly characterizes discourse between participants in 
incommensurable points of view.” Thomas Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in CRITICISM AND 
THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 231–32 (Imre Laktos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970). 
124 Adam Gopnick, Bigger than Phil: When Did Faith Start to Fade?, THE NEW YORKER, 
February 9, 2014, at 107. 
125 See, e.g., DAVID EDMONDS & JOHN EIDINOW, WITTGENSTEIN’S POKER: THE STORY OF A 
TEN-MINUTE ARGUMENT BETWEEN TWO GREAT PHILOSOPHERS (2001); HAL HELLMAN, GREAT 
FEUDS IN SCIENCE: TEN OF THE LIVELIEST DISPUTES EVER (1998). 
126 STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 106 (2003). 
Neil Duxbury candidly observed: “When debunking is done well, it is frequently impossible for 
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frustrated ambitions exacerbate the problem,127 creating the “sworn enemies and bitter 
critics long produced by academic life.”128 “Within the academic profession, fights are 
often intramural,” wrote Charles Bernstein, “as new disciplinary and methodological 
projects threaten older ones, the new and the old both claiming to be victims of 
unprecedented dogmatism, bad faith, and a lack of intellectual or cultural values.”129   
Seen in this light, there is no real difference between conflict generated by CLS 
and heated intradisciplinary conflicts elsewhere: e.g., conflicts between human and 
physical geographers;130 between institutionalist and neoclassical economists;131 
between New Critics and poststructuralists in literature;132 between quantitative and 
qualitative political scientists;133 between biological and cultural anthropologists;134 or 
between sociologists who recognize the concept of deviance and those who do not.135  
The fact is that, debilitating or distasteful as it may be, “controversy has always 
been a vital part of academic life.”136 Louis Menand reminded us that “quarreling with 
one another” over “competing paradigms . . . is a sign of life” for the discipline.137 
“The danger for the academic profession is not that one side or the other will ‘win,’” 
wrote Charles Bernstein. “Rather, the problem is the idea that consensus should 
prevail. Manufacturing consent always involves devaluing or excluding that which 
does not fit in the frame.”138  
 
the spectator–unless the target–not to experience Schadenfreude. To be responsible for 
generating such experience must be exhilarating.” DUXBURY, supra note 110, at 421. 
127 See RHODE, supra note 36, at 9–13. 
128 RUSSELL JACOBY, THE LAST INTELLECTUALS: AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE AGE OF ACADEME 
141 (1982). 
129 Charles Bernstein, A Blow is Like an Instrument, in THE AMERICAN ACADEMIC PROFESSION 
183 (Stephen R. Graubard ed., 2001). 
130 See Heather Viles, A Divided Discipline? in QUESTIONING GEOGRAPHY: FUNDAMENTAL 
DEBATES (Noel Castree et al. eds., 2005). 
131 See YUVAL P. YONAY, THE STRUGGLE OVER THE SOUL OF ECONOMICS: INSTITUTIONALIST 
AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMISTS IN AMERICA BETWEEN THE WARS (1998). 
132 See M. H. Abrams, “The Transformation of English Studies: 1930-1995", in AMERICAN 
ACADEMIC CULTURE IN TRANSFORMATION: FIFTY YEARS, FOUR DISCIPLINES (Thomas Bender & 
Carl E. Schorske eds., 1997). 
133 See DAVID M. RICCI, THE TRAGEDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: POLITICS, SCHOLARSHIP, AND 
DEMOCRACY (1984). 
134 See ROBERT H. LAVENDA & EMILY A. SHULTZ, ANTHROPOLOGY: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO 
BE HUMAN? 6 (2008); SYDEL SILVERMAN, THE BEAST ON THE TABLE: CONFERENCING WITH 
ANTHROPOLOGISTS 228–229 (2002). 
135 See ANNE HENDERSHOTT, THE POLITICS OF DEVIANCE (2002). 
136 Goodheart, supra note 123, at 154. 
137 LOUIS MENAND, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN THE AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY 63 (2010). 
138 Bernstein, supra note 129, at 183. 
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If tensions and controversies are signs of disciplinary good health, then law is a 
healthy academic discipline.139   
III. PART THREE: A FINAL ATTACK–LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP WITHOUT PEER 
REVIEW 
A. Law’s Publication of Articles Without Peer Review 
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of academic research and 
scholarship to contemporary university life. Deborah Rhode wrote that “throughout 
the American academy, scholarship has become the principal foundation of status.”140 
To Burton Clark, higher education in the United States was “hugely based on 
research.”141 Jacques Barzun thought that the academy operates under “the prevailing 
belief . . . that research is the great justification for the whole enterprise.”142 Academic 
lawyers produce their share of scholarship, but critics condemn the fact that most of it 
is published in journals (law reviews) controlled by students rather than by 
professional scholars. This arrangement is an academic curiosity, apparently unique 
to law.143 Paul Samuelson found it “incredible,” adding that the “academic mind 
boggles at the thought.”144 Critics have derided student editors.145 “Given the 
handicaps of ignorance, immaturity, inexperience, and inadequate incentives,” wrote 
Richard Posner, “the wonder is not that law reviews leave much to be desired as 
scholarly journals, but that they aren’t much worse than they are.”146 
 
139 Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CALIF. 
L. REV. 889, 892 (1992) (“Its boundaries are particularly permeable, its debates particularly 
intense, and its transformations over time particularly extensive.”). 
140 RHODE, supra note 36, at 36. 
141 THE AMERICAN ACADEMIC PROFESSION 21 (Stephen R. Graubard ed., Transaction 
Publishers 2001); accord Rubin, supra note 141, at 891; MENAND, supra note 137, at 76; 
Samuelson, supra note 7, at 259. 
142 JACQUES BARZUN, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY–HOW IT RUNS, WHERE IT IS GOING 20 
(1966). 
143 Cramton, supra note 47, at 1; Ronald D. Rotunda, Law Reviews–An Extreme Centrist 
Position, 62 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1986). 
144 Samuelson, supra note 7, at 260. 
145 Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal Scholarship: Some Comments, 75 DENV. 
L. REV. 661, 661 (1998) (“There is, in fact, quite a literature of invective – professors and others 
railing against the law reviews.”). For example Lindgren, supra note 47, at 527 (“Our scholarly 
journals are in the hands of incompetents.”); John G. Kester, Faculty Participation in the 
Student-Edited Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14, 14 (1986) (“[O]ne of the few reported cases 
of inmates truly running the asylum.”); Alan W. Mewett, Reviewing the Law Reviews, 8 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 188, 190 (1955) (“[T]he student, as such, has no place on a law review at all.”). 
But see KARL LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 111 
(Oxford University Press 2008) (“[Law reviews are] a thing Americans may well be proud of.”). 
146 Richard A Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 
1132 (1995). One suspects that some of the hostility law professors exhibit toward law reviews 
stems from their past experiences as law review authors. Authors rarely enjoy criticism of their 
manuscripts, even from professional editors. See John K. Paine, Line Editing–The Art of the 
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Student editors assume all functions, including decisions on what to publish. 
Moreover, they usually make those decisions on their own, i.e. unaided by the 
evaluations of outside experts (peer review). The absence of peer review may bear the 
brunt of attacks on law reviews. For example, James Lindgren complained: “Scholars 
elsewhere frequently can’t believe that, for almost all our academic journals, we let 
students without advanced degrees select manuscripts. As faculty members, we must 
begin to take responsibility for the monster that our predecessors created.”147 
We are now at a critical juncture in our consideration whether law really is an 
academic discipline. We shall see that peer review is central to traditions of university 
scholarship. Does the lack of peer-review for most legal scholarship therefore hurt 
law’s disciplinary claim? This challenge reflects an undeniable cultural divide 
between law professors and the rest of the academy.148 It probably poses the most 
serious barrier to the acceptance of law as an academic discipline. The peer-review 
challenge will therefore receive the most attention in this Article. While that 
discussion will incorporate criticisms of peer review by those who have been subject 
to it,149 I must stress that my purpose is not to reform peer review. It would be 
presumptuous of me (an outsider) to try to do so.    
My argument instead is that, when one compares the particular strengths and 
weaknesses of law reviews with those of peer-reviewed journals, the legal academy 
does not suffer from the difference. This is because (1) legal scholars are subject to 
other forms of peer review; (2) peer review contributes less to scholarship than might 
first appear; (3) law reviews offer countervailing advantages.       
B. The Peer-Review Requirement for Articles in Other Disciplines 
Peer review pervades other academic fields. It “is embedded into the structures 
and processes of virtually all academic journals.”150 Clearly, “with only minor 
variations, peer review processes are used across the range of disciplines 
 
Reasonable Suggestion, in EDITORS ON EDITING–WHAT WRITERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT WHAT 
EDITORS DO 170 (Gerald Gross 3d ed. 1993). Worse however is the indignity of receiving 
criticism from mere law students – the kind of persons law professors are accustomed to awing 
in the classroom. A veteran law review author observed half-humorously that students “edit and 
criticize . . . articles (and by implication, their authors),” although the authors are “their 
experiential and – hell! – moral superiors.” James W. Harper, Why Student-Run Law Reviews, 
82 MINN. L. REV. 1261, 1270 (1997). Students can irritate authors when they simply act like 
editors. Like any effective editor, they are required “to nag, to question, to probe, not to give 
the author the benefit of the doubt.” Maron L. Waxman, Line Editing–Drawing Out the Best 
Book Possible, in EDITORS ON EDITING–WHAT WRITERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT WHAT EDITORS 
DO 155 (Gerald Gross 3d ed. 1993). 
147 Lindgren, supra note 47, at 535; see also Cramton, supra note 47, at 7–8 (“The claim that 
student editors can recognize whether scholarly articles make an original contribution 
throughout the domain the of law is now viewed by legal scholars as indefensible.”). Van Zandt, 
supra note 32, at 332 (noting “the lack of strong norms of peer review” as a reason why “the 
work of many law school faculty falls short of the standards that prevail in other disciplines.”). 
148 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 7, at 260. 
149 See infra notes 154–200 and accompanying text. 
150 Elizabeth Wager & Tom Jefferson, Shortcomings of Peer Review in Biomedical Journals, 
14 LEARNED PUB. 257, 257 (2001). 
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encompassing the sciences, arts, and humanities.”151 Ernest Boyer wrote: “What is 
important, regardless of the field, is that research results must be published and peer 
reviewed.”152 An academic journal remarked in an editorial: “Questioning peer review 
is like questioning the Bible, Quran, or Torah.”153 
Peer review has been described as “a process of systematically distributing, 
evaluating, and reaching a consensus on the merits of submitted manuscripts.”154 The 
practice can be traced at least to the 1665 founding of the journal, Philosophical 
Transactions, by the British Royal Society.155 In the 20th century, when scholarship 
displaced teaching as the most valued function of academic life,156 academic journals 
(hence peer review) assumed paramount importance. 
Journals do not send all of the manuscripts they receive to peer reviewers.157 
“Editors . . . always have had the option of returning an off-topic, inappropriately 
formatted, or clearly uncompetitive manuscript to its author without having it sent out 
for review.”158 The proportion of manuscripts clearing this hurdle varies with each 
journal.159 The editor sends the surviving manuscripts out for review by experts (peers) 
active in the same research area.160 Peer reviewers “are generally asked to classify the 
paper as publishable immediately, publishable with amendments and improvements, 
or not publishable.”161 The degree of reliance upon reviewer recommendations varies. 
“Half of journal editors,” by one estimate, “rely almost exclusively on reviewer 
recommendations when making acceptance decisions.”162  
 
151 Id. 
152 ERNEST L. BOYER, SCHOLARSHIP RECONSIDERED–PRIORITIES OF THE PROFESSORIATE 29 
(John Wiley & Sons ed., 1990). 
153 Fiana Linkov et al., Scientific Journals are “Faith Based”: Is There Science Behind Peer 
Review?, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 596, 597 (2006). 
154 Dale J. Benos et al., The Ups and Downs of Peer Review, 31 ADVANCES PHYSIOLOGY EDUC. 
145, 145 (2007). 
155 Harriet Zuckerman & Robert C. Merton, Patterns of Evaluation in Science: 
Institutionalisation, Structure and Functions of the Referee System, 9 MINERVA 66, 68 (1971). 
156 See MENAND, supra note 137, at 76; SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND 
HONOR IN THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS 279, 285–86 (University of Chicago Press 1991). 
157 See Cassidy R. Sugimoto et al., Journal Acceptance Rates: A Cross-Disciplinary Analysis 
of Variability and Relationships with Journal Measures, 7 J. INFORMETRICS 897 (2013). 
158 Jerry Suls & Rene Martin, The Air We Breathe–A Critical Look at Practices and 
Alternatives in the Peer-Review Process, 4 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 40, 41 (2009). 
159 Mary Biggs, The Impact of Peer Review on Intellectual Freedom, 39 LIBR. TRENDS 145, 
147 (1990) (“ranging from less than half to nearly all.”). 
160 Herbert W. Marsh & Samuel Ball, The Peer-Review Process Used to Evaluate Manuscripts 
Submitted to Academic Journals, 57 EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 151, 152 (1989). 
161 Fytton Rowland, The Peer-Review Process, 15 LEARNED PUB. 247, 247 (2002). 
162 Michael L. Callaham et al., Reliability of Editors’ Subjective Quality Ratings of Peer 
Reviews of Manuscripts, 280 [J]AMA 229, 230 (1998). 
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C. Law’s Forms of Peer Review 
There are at least a few faculty-edited, peer-reviewed law reviews.163 Moreover, 
student editors considering a manuscript may always obtain a measure of peer review 
by referring it to a faculty member at their school who is knowledgeable in the field. 
This practice is important164 and widely used.165 “True, faculty members acted only 
by invitation,” observed a former law review editor, “[b]ut the invitations were 
frequent, and were built into the editorial process.”166 Finally, student editors have 
occasionally adopted formal peer review.167 
Law review authors often follow a practice that approximates the positive aspects 
of peer review. Acknowledgments in their published articles often disclose that they 
sent their manuscripts to colleagues for comment before submitting them to reviews.  
This practice can be quite beneficial, enabling authors to “receive and incorporate 
substantial suggestions.”168      
Peer-reviewed journals give stature to scholars and their disciplines because 
publication is thought to convey approval by experts.169 The availability of this 
distinction however is not limited to academic journals. Peer review is similarly used 
 
163 E.g., American Journal of Comparative Law, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of 
Legal Studies, Supreme Court Review. 
164 See Rotunda, supra note 145, at 2; Phil Nichols, A Student Defense of Student Edited 
Journals: In Response to Professor Roger Cramton, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1122, 1128 (1987); 
Reinhard Zimmerman, Law Reviews: A Foray Through a Strange World, 47 EMORY L.J. 659, 
674 (1998). 
165 Jordan H. Leibman & James P. White, How the Student-Edited Law Journals Make Their 
Publication Decisions, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 387, 408 (1989). 
166 Kester, supra note 145, at 14. 
167 E.g., Submissions, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, 
lawreview.uchicago.edu/submissions (last visited Aug. 16, 2019) (“The Law Review 
occasionally solicits feedback on submissions from scholars who are expert in their field. Please 
be aware that this peer review is part of the standard review process that your article may 
undergo.”). 
168 Carol Sanger, Editing, 82 GEO. L.J. 513, 524 (1993). 
169 See Zuckerman & Merton, supra note 155, at 97. This might suggest that journals without 
peer review would be correspondingly less attractive to authors. How then does one explain 
why established scholars from other disciplines (who regularly appear in their own peer-
reviewed journals) also publish in student-edited law reviews? For example Terence C. 
Halliday, Legitimacy, Technology, and Leverage: The Building Blocks of Insolvency 
Architecture in the Decade Past and the Decade Ahead, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1081 (2007); 
Susan Shapiro, If It Ain’t Broke...An Empirical Perspective on Ethics 2000, Screening the 
Conflict-of-Interest Rules, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1299 (2003); Steven J. Sherman, The Capital 
Jury Project: The Role of Responsibility and How Psychology Can Inform the Law, 70 IND. L.J. 
1241 (1995); Stephen Daniels, The Supreme Court and Obscenity: An Exercise in Empirical 
Constitutional Policy-Making, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 757 (1980); Kathleen Daly, Criminal Law 
and Justice System Practices as Racist, White, and Radicalized, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 431 
(1994); Michael L. Randelet, Capital Punishment in Colorado: 1859–1972, 74 Colo. L. Rev. 
(2003). 
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to evaluate scholarly book proposals170and to evaluate applications for research 
grants.171 Insofar as law professors actively compete for these opportunities (and many 
do), they also participate in the peer-review process. 
Peer review has been touted as an incentive for authors to write better 
manuscripts,172 but authors are also pressured to do their best work by the specter of 
reviews appearing after the article is published. Peer review never really ends. It 
continues far beyond consideration of a particular article, book, or grant proposal to 
address the sum of a scholar’s accomplishments. Review of a candidate’s published 
work is undertaken by “evaluators who decide on hiring, tenure, promotion, and 
salaries.”173 It is also crucial for obtaining endowed professorships, distinguished-
lecture invitations, election to learned societies, and more.174 Edward Rubin wrote: 
“One’s personal reputation as a scholar is heavily, if not exclusively, determined by 
the evaluation of one’s work”175 –  and, one could add, by successive reevaluations of 
the author’s output (up or down) over time. As Becher and Trowler noted, “leadership 
is only granted on sufferance, and those who are accorded it have to continue to justify 
themselves as especially competent and active exponents of their discipline.”176 Again, 
law professors are as subject to this form of peer review as other academics.  
D. Problems with Peer Review in Academic Journals 
Critics rarely explain precisely how peer review would improve articles published 
in law reviews. Perhaps they regard this as unnecessary, since the goals of peer review 
are well-recognized. Along with journal editors, peer reviewers are thought to be 
“important gatekeepers of disciplinary norms,”177 to be at the center of “the quality 
control system for academic knowledge.”178 They are expected to police their 
disciplines – guiding readers toward original and important scholarship while 
protecting them from flawed or unimportant work. They are also expected to mentor 
authors: 
They can . . . suggest basic revisions for improving papers. They 
sometimes link up the paper with other work which the author 
happened not to know; they protect the author from unwittingly 
 
170 See Zuckerman & Merton, supra note 155, at 66; David A. Shatz, Is Peer Review 
Overrated?, 79 THE MONIST 536, 536 (1996). 
171 See Rowland, supra note 161, at 247; Biggs, supra note 159, at 146. 
172 See Michael Wood & Martyn Roberts, The Reliability of Peer Reviews of Papers on 
Information Systems, 30 J. INFO. SCI. 2, 11 (2004). 
173 Shatz, supra note 170, at 536. 
174 See Uschi Backes-Gellner & Axel Schlinghoff, Career Incentives and “Publish or Perish” 
in German and U.S. Universities, 42 EUR. EDUC. 26, 46 (2010). 
175 Rubin, supra note 139, at 893. 
176 TONY BECHER & PAUL R. TROWLER, ACADEMIC TRIBES AND TERRITORIES–INTELLECTUAL 
ENQUIRY AND THE CULTURES OF DISCIPLINES 86 (2d ed. 2001). 
177 Robert Post, Debating Disciplinarity, 35 YALE LAW SCHOOL, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP 
SERIES 749, 753 (2009). 
178 Wood & Roberts, supra note 174, at 2. 
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publishing duplications of earlier work; and, of course, as 
presumable experts in the subject, they may in effect certify the 
paper as a contribution by recommending its publication.179  
This sounds good in theory. In a comprehensive survey however, only 65% of 
researchers were satisfied with peer review.180 Many who have looked at peer review 
believe that the process remains understudied and unclear.181 What is clear is that peer 
review has generated considerable dissatisfaction.182 We will soon see how reviewer 
shortages, negativity bias, confirmation bias, prestige bias, conflict of interest, and 
 
179 Zuckerman & Merton, supra note 155, at 96–97. 
180 MARK WARE, PUB. RES. CONSORTIUM, PEER REVIEW SURVEY–2015 2 (2016). 
181 E.g., Michael J. Mahoney, Publication Prejudices: A Experimental Study of Confirmatory 
Bias in the Peer Review System, 1 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 161, 174 (1977) (“Without 
further scrutiny of the purposes and processes of peer review, we are left with little to defend it 
other than tradition.”); Callaham et al., supra note 164, at 229 (“Little is known about the quality 
of peer review.”); Von Bakanic et al., The Manuscript Review and Decision-Making Process, 
52 AM. SOC. REV. 631, 631 (1987); (“[T]here has been little research on the manuscript review 
and decision-making process.”); Linkov et al., supra note 153, at 596 (“[T]he primary reason 
that journals have not changed is that they are ‘faith based’: we believe in them, we dare not 
question them.”); Drummond Rennie, Editorial Peer Review: Its Development and Rationale, 
in PEER REVIEW IN HEALTH SCIENCES 1 (BMU Books ed. 2003) (“Most peer review systems and 
alternatives remain poorly studied.”); William Clark, ACADEMIC CHARISMA AND THE ORIGINS 
OF THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY 14 (University of Chicago Press 2006) (describing peer review 
as a “mysterious modern institution.”); Marsh & Ball, supra note 160, at 152 (“[T]here is little 
research on the policy practices that define the peer review process and how well those policy 
practices work.”); Tom Jefferson et al., Measuring the Quality of Editorial Peer Review, 287 J. 
AMA 2786, 2787 (2002) (suggesting that peer review’s “true effects have not been determined, 
or that the aims of peer review have not been identified properly.”); Arnold S. Relman & Marcia 
Angell, How Good Is Peer Review?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 827, 828 (1989) (“[M]any 
researchers and reviewers involved in peer review have widely different perceptions of its 
functions and methods.”); Arturo Casadevall & Ferric C. Fang, Is Peer Review Censorship?, 77 
INFECTION & IMMUNITY 1273, 1273 (2009) (“[T]here are remarkably little data that the system 
works as intended.”). 
182 E.g., Biggs, supra note 159, at 146 (“[D]espite the long history supporting peer review, its 
value continues to be debated.”); Douglas P. Peters & Stephen J. Ceci, Peer-Review Practices 
of Psychological Journals: The Fate of Published Articles, Submitted Again, 5 BEHAV. & BRAIN 
SCI. 187, 194 (1982) (noting “a growing concern about the adequacy of our present journal 
review system.”); Shatz, supra note 170, at 536 (“[I]mportant lines of objection may be raised 
to peer review.”); Norval D. Glenn, The Journal Article Review Process: Some Proposals for 
Change, 11 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 179, 179 (1976) (noting “apparent widespread dissatisfaction 
among authors with the evaluations of the papers they submit.”); Suls & Martin, supra note 158, 
at 42 (“[C]riticisms of peer review abound.”); Rennie, supra note 181, at 10 ([T]here is 
“growing evidence that peer review is a blunt, inefficient, and expensive tool . . . a marketing 
tool for journals trying to pretend that their quality control is tight.”); NELSON & WATT, supra 
note 48, at 211 (“Peer reviewing needs to be peer-reviewed.”); Lonnie W. Aarssen & 
Christopher J. Lortie, Ending Elitism in Peer-Review Publication, 2 IDEAS ECOLOGY & 
EVOLUTION 18 (2009) (“Researchers . . . remain frustrated by limitations [of the peer-review 
process] that continue to escape solutions.”); Mahoney, supra note 181, at 163 (“[E]ditorials 
and special articles have often cited the deficiencies of current review practices.”); Casadevall 
& Fang, supra note 183, at 1273 (noting “abundant evidence of imperfections in the peer review 
process.”). 
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other frailties of the peer-review process have taken a toll on scholars and on their 
disciplines. 
Part of the problem stems from the astonishing rate at which peer-reviewed 
academic journals have multiplied.183 Jerry Jacobs reported in 2013 that there were 
“twenty-eight thousand active peer-reviewed journals.”184 Manuscript submissions 
have increased accordingly. “In any given year,” according to one study, “[peer-
reviewed] journals publish, at a conservative estimate, a million articles.”185  
This trend naturally reduces the availability of peer reviewers. “While the 
exponential growth of professional journals places a high premium on expert 
reviewers,” said one observer, “the pool of qualified reviewers is quite small.”186 
Demand has long outstripped the number of such experts available.187 At least two 
problems have resulted. 
First, the growing shortage means that it takes longer to locate reviewers willing 
to serve, and that (because reviewers are increasingly overworked) reviews take longer 
to complete. This extends the period from submission to publication, already regarded 
as “objectionably slow.”188 Glen Ellison noted that time for leading economics 
journals went from “six to nine months” in 1972 to “about two years” in 2002.189 As 
Aarssen and Lortie stated, delays can be prejudicial: “it can often take more than a 
year to get a new idea published, by which time it may already be old – scooped by 
someone else.”190 
Second, the growing shortage of peer reviewers has forced many journal editors to 
lower their reviewer-selection standards.191 Andrew Abbott described the situation in 
sociology. In all but the top journals, “most articles are reviewed not by nationally 
known experts in the fields they involve,” he wrote, “but by people of lesser stature, 
indeed often by those whose scholarly judgment is hardly known at all by editors: 
 
183 See Aarssen & Lortie, supra note 182, at 18. 
184 JACOBS, supra note 54, at 54. 
185 Carol J. Lee et al., Bias in Peer Review, 64 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 2, 4 
(2013). Ken Hyland’s subsequent study estimated production of “over 1.5 million peer reviewed 
articles each year.” Ken Hyland, Academic Publishing and the Myth of Linguistic Injustice, 31 
J. SECOND LANGUAGE WRITING 58, 58 (2016). 
186 Mohammadreza Hojat et al., Impartial Judgment by the “Gatekeepers” of Science: 
Fallibility and Accountability in the Peer Review Process, 8 ADVANCES HEALTH SCI. EDUC. 75, 
85 (2003). 
187 See CHRIS CHAMBERS, THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS OF PSYCHOLOGY–A MANIFESTO FOR 
REFORMING SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 89 (Princeton Univ. Press 2017); Biggs, supra note 159, at 
158; Glenn, supra note 182, at 180. 
188 James V. Bradley, Pernicious Publication Practices, 18 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 31, 
34 (1981) [hereinafter Bradley, Pernicious Publication Practices]. 
189 Glenn Ellison, The Slowdown of the Economics Publishing Process, 110 J. POL. ECONOMY 
947, 948 (2002). 
190 Aarssen & Lortie, supra note 182, at 18. 
191 Sneha Kulkarni, What Causes Peer Review Scams and How Can They Be Prevented, 29 
LEARNED PUBLISHING 211, 212 (2015). 
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graduate students, people culled from the prospective article’s bibliography, people 
suggested by friends in answer to desperate phone calls.”192  
This worsens a related problem: editors may not be familiar enough with the 
subjects addressed by manuscripts to know what kind of expert to look for.193 Peer-
reviewer selection under these circumstances can amount to guesswork. James 
Bradley learned from the group of scholars he studied “that 53% of them had been 
asked to referee an article that they were incompetent to review.”194  
Unfortunately, not all who are unqualified to review articles can be trusted to 
decline.195 Studies suggest that, when unqualified persons agree to peer review, they 
may be inclined to mask their insecurity with negativity bias.196 That is,  
in an effort to preserve their self-esteem and their esteem in the eyes 
of observers, they may become negatively critical of the intelligence 
or intellectual work of others. This self-presentation . . . is based on 
the assumption that negative criticism is indeed perceived as more 
intelligent, incisive, and insightful than praise.197  
Even knowledgeable peer reviewers may cause problems. “Peer review is a human 
activity: reviewers, like editors, may be partial, biased, jealous, . . . malicious, corrupt, 
or incapacitated by conflicts of interest.”198 Beyond these palpable reviewer 
shortcomings lie subtler human frailties. One of the saddest realizations emerging 
from a study of academic culture is how often scholars lack intellectual curiosity about 
views unlike their own. “In academia,” Edward Rubin observed, “opinion is 
inescapable, and bias becomes an increasing danger as the author’s viewpoint diverges 
from the evaluator’s.”199 Attempts to communicate new ideas can be exasperating. 
Describing his “classic stages of a theory’s career,” William James confirmed this: 
“First, you know, a new theory is attacked as absurd; then it is admitted as true, but 
obvious and insignificant; finally, it is seen as so important that its adversaries claim 
that they themselves discovered it.”200   
 
192 ANDREW ABBOTT, DEPARTMENT AND DISCIPLINE–CHICAGO SOCIOLOGY AT ONE HUNDRED 
190–91 (1999). 
193 See Mark D. Street et al., Author Perceptions of Positive and Negative Behaviors in the 
Manuscript Review Process, 13 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 1, 4 (1998); Bradley, 
Pernicious Publication Practices, supra note 188, at 34; Rennie, supra note 181, at 5–6. 
194 Bradley, Pernicious Publication Practices, supra note 188, at 34. 
195 See James V. Bradley, Overconfidence in Ignorant Experts, 17 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 
82, 84 (1981) [hereinafter Bradley, Overconfidence in Ignorant Experts]. 
196 See Lynne M. Cooper, Problems, Pitfalls, and Promise in the Peer-Review Process, 4 
PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 84, 85 (2009); Suls & Martin, supra note 158, at 43. 
197 Teresa M. Amabile, Brilliant but Cruel: Perceptions of Negative Evaluators, 19 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 146, 147 (1983). 
198 Rennie, supra note 181, at 8. 
199 Rubin, supra note 141, at 941. 
200 William James, The Works of William James: Pragmatism, in RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, 
BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 51 (Univ. of Pa. 
Press 1982). 
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Peer reviewers can resist or suppress ideas because they are new, a concern 
expressed by many commentators.”201 This has been termed confirmation bias, 
“defined as a tendency of some reviewers to accept outcomes that agree with 
commonly accepted theories and to discredit those that do not.”202 The author of a 
leading peer review study wrote: “Confirmatory experiences are selectively welcomed 
and granted easy credibility. Disconfirmatory experiences, on the other hand, are often 
ignored, discredited, or treated with obvious defensiveness.”203 Confirmation bias 
harms authors. It also harms disciplines by stifling innovation.204   
A different type of bias occurs when peer reviewers favor certain authors simply 
because they are well-known or reside at elite universities. Called prestige bias, it is 
considered widespread and a cause for concern.205 Suls and Martin observed: “a wealth 
of experimental social psychological evidence supports the pervasive influence of halo 
and prestige effects. There is no obvious reason why peer reviewers would be immune 
to such social perceptual biases.”206  
Prestige bias afflicts journal editors as well.  “If an editor receives a manuscript 
from an unknown man [or woman] which seems wrong, obscure, or absurd, he will 
normally simply reject it after one reading,” explained Gordon Tullock. “The same 
manuscript from a prominent man [or woman],” he continued, “would be reread a 
number of times before the editor decided that it was really wrong, obscure, or 
absurd.”207 Subtle or overt, prestige bias “proves to have no validity.”208 It crowds out 
the work of more deserving (if less established) scholars, offering the illusion of 
stature at the expense of quality. 
 
201 See Davis Trafimow & Stephen Rice, What if Social Scientists Had Reviewed Great 
Scientific Works of the Past?, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 65, 77 (2009); Cooper, supra note 196 
at 84; Aarssen & Lortie, supra note 182, at 18; Benos et al., supra note 156, at 147; William H. 
Starbuck, Turning Lemons into Lemonade–Where is the Value in Peer Reviews?, 12 J. MGMT. 
INQUIRY 344–45 (2003); Hojat et al., supra note 186, at 81; Rennie, supra note 181, at 9; 
NELSON & WATT, supra note 48, at 213; see generally OMAR SWARTZ, CONDUCTING SOCIALLY 
RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: CRITICAL THEORY, NEO-PRAGMATISM, AND RHETORICAL INQUIRY 2 
(Sage Publications 1997); Rubin, supra note 141, at 900; Bruce M. Smith & Pauline B. Gough, 
Editors Speak Out on Refereeing, 65 THE PHI DELTA KAPPAN 637, 639 (1984). 
202 Hojat et al., supra note 186, at 78. 
203 Mahoney, supra note 181, at 161–62. Authors of another study reported that peer reviewers 
displayed “a significant bias in favor of the orthodox version.” K. I. Resch et al., A Randomized 
Controlled Study of Reviewer Bias Against an Unconventional Therapy, 93 J. ROYAL SOC. MED. 
164, 164 (2000).   
204 See David F. Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of 
Innovation, 263 [J]AMA 1438 (1990); Trafimow & Rice, supra note 201, at 77; Benos et al., 
supra note 154, at 147; Rennie, supra note 181, at 9. 
205 See, e.g., Harriet Zuckerman, Stratification in American Science, 40 SOC. INQUIRY 235, 
235 (1970); Bakanic et al., supra note 181, at 640; Cooper, supra note 197, at 85; Hojat et al., 
supra note 186, at 79; Biggs, supra note 182, at 148; Mahoney, supra note 181, at 163. 
206 Suls & Martin, supra note 133, at 44. 
207 GORDON TULLOCK, The Organization of Inquiry, in 3 THE SELECTED WORKS OF GORDON 
TULLOCK 119 (Charles Rowlet ed., Liberty Fund 2005). 
208 Peters & Ceci, supra note 182, at 194. 
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Peer reviewers at times treat authors unkindly. They can “seem arrogant, 
disrespectful, even nasty.”209 Respondents in one study felt that “perhaps the most 
vexatious” aspect of peer review was that reviewers were “often arrogant or 
obnoxious.”210 One veteran described the peer review experience as “a socially 
approved form of intellectual sadomasochism.”211    
Reviewer hostility may be symptomatic of a more serious problem. The search for 
reviewers poses an inherent dilemma for journal editors. If the reviewer’s expertise is 
distant from the subject of the manuscript, the reviewer is not competent to evaluate 
it. But, if the subject of the author’s work is within the reviewer’s expertise, the 
reviewer may see the author as an unwelcome rival. “This raises the possibility that 
limiting the dissemination of an author’s findings could be in a reviewer’s best 
interests.”212 The possibility of a reviewer’s conflict of interest is well-recognized.213  
Self-interested peer reviewers can victimize authors in different ways. They can 
attack the author’s manuscript,214 pilfer ideas from it,215 block publication of an article 
questioning the reviewer’s own work,216 or delay publication of an article similar to 
one the reviewer intends to publish first.217  
 
209 Starbuck, supra note 201, at 344. 
210 Bradley, Pernicious Publication Practices, supra note 188, at 34. 
211 Morris B. Holbrook, A Note on Sadomasochism in the Review Process: I Hate When That 
Happens, 50 J. MARKETING 104, 105 (1986). 
212 Suls & Martin, supra note 158, at 43. 
213 See, e.g., Rennie, supra note 181 at 9; Relman, supra note 181, at 828; Zuckerman, 
Patterns of Evaluation in Science: Institutionalization, Structure, and Functions of the Referee 
System, supra note 155, at 97. 
214 See Cooper, supra note 196, at 85. 
215 See Zuckerman, Patterns of Evaluation in Science: Institutionalization, Structure, and 
Functions of the Referee System, supra note 155, at 97. 
216 See Casadevall & Fang, supra note 181, at 1274. 
217 See generally Thomas C. Chalmers et al., Minimizing the Three Stages of Publication Bias, 
263 [J]AMA 1392 (1990). 
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Ambiguities of peer review enable reviewers to mask bias or untoward motives. 
William Starbuck explained how rejection of virtually any manuscript can be made to 
appear fair-minded and plausible: “Every manuscript can be said to deserve rejection. 
Every manuscript contains poorly phrased statements. Every manuscript fails to 
mention some relevant literature. Every manuscript makes arguments that could be 
more cleanly reasoned. Every theory overlooks some potentially important 
contingencies.”218 In their illuminating and entertaining article,219 David Trafimow 
and Stephen Rice demonstrated how far it was possible to stretch such criticisms.220 
The authors created a series of parodies in which great scientists (including Galileo, 
Newton, Harvey, and Einstein) tried to introduce their famous theories by submitting 
papers to an academic journal.221 In letters summarizing the negative responses of peer 
reviewers, the journal editor rejected the submissions of all four scientists. 222 Most 
intriguing in the article is how plausible empty reviewer-speak could be made to 
sound. 
Another problem in peer review is the frequent inability of reviewers to agree. 
Inconsistent peer reviews have been a perennial concern.223 The combustible nature 
of academic discourse contributes to this problem. As noted earlier,224 sharp 
differences regularly occur within disciplines. David Papineau’s observation about 
philosophy, that “there will always be incompatible theories to explain any given body 
of observational facts,”225 applies throughout academia. 
Similarly, Andrew Abbott wrote: “Disputes . . . founded on abstract knowledge” 
are intense, “for the plasticity of abstract argument makes the competition more 
 
218 Starbuck, supra note 201, at 348–49. 
219 Trafimow & Rice, supra note 201. 
220 Id. at 65. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 See, e.g., Stephen Cole et al., Chance and Consensus in Peer Review, 214 SCI. 881, 881 
(1981) (in peer-reviewed grant applications to the National Science Foundation, “disagreement 
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in determining the outcome of peer review, and agreement between reviewers is disconcertingly 
low”); Bakanic et. al., supra note 181, at 632 (“Accumulating evidence suggests that agreement 
among peer reviewers is the exception rather than the rule”); Suls & Martin, supra note 158, at 
44 (“reviewers rarely agree regarding the merits of any given manuscript”); Starbuck, supra 
note 201, at 346 (a journal editor noted that only a “small fraction of the reviewers agreed with 
each other”). 
224 See supra notes 124–38 and accompanying text. 
225 DAVID PAPINEAU, Methodology: The Elements of the Philosophy of Science, in 
PHILOSOPHY- A GUIDE THROUGH THE SUBJECT 154 (A.C. Grayling ed., Oxford Univ. Press ed. 
1995); accord, Jonathan Culler, Introduction: What’s the Point? to THE POINT OF THEORY- 
PRACTICES OF CULTURAL ANALYSIS, 15 (Mieke Bal & Ingre E. Boer eds., Amsterdam Univ. 
Press 1996) (“The nature of theory . . . is to undo, through a contesting of premises and 
postulates, what you thought you knew, so that there may appear to be no real accumulation of 
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fierce.”226 In this vein, George Geiger noted that “so often we think the problem 
‘solved’ when our abstraction has so overcome our opponent’s that, for a moment, he 
can think of no other abstraction with which to counter-attack.”227 The loose-textured 
nature of a theory invites a counter-theory, producing debate without definitive 
resolution. Disputes are not confined to theory. The author’s research methodology or 
data interpretations may also invite attack. “Every topic of research is infinite,” said 
Robert Frodeman, “there is no final or unimpeachable answer that does not give rise 
to another question.”228   
The assorted frailties of the peer-review process have taken their toll. Scholars 
outside the legal academy depend upon successful peer-reviewed publication for their 
academic survival and advancement. Without it, the author “can have little hope of 
either personal advancement or recognized professional contribution.”229 As 
sociologist Norval Glenn observed: “Who knows how many persons have failed to 
receive tenure, promotions, and pay raises because of patently unfair rejections of their 
papers–or how many promising young sociologists have given up aspirations to be 
productive researchers or scholars after a few experiences with the vagaries of the 
review process.”230  
Disciplines also suffer when peer review misfires.231 The purpose of academic 
journals, to enlarge and refine disciplinary knowledge, will be frustrated.232 
Unqualified, biased, self-interested, or idiosyncratic reviewers will fail as gatekeepers 
because they will not direct members of their discipline to the most original or 
important work.233  
E. The Bright Side of Law Reviews 
How do student-edited law reviews fare when compared to peer-reviewed 
academic journals? Can mere law students – unaided by the judgments of professional 
legal scholars – serve as adequate gatekeepers for legal scholarship?  
It is useful in answering this question to divide manuscripts submitted to law 
reviews into two categories. The first (and largest) category consists of articles on 
mainstream legal topics, what Richard Posner termed “doctrinal scholarship.”234 The 
second (and growing) category consists of interdisciplinary legal scholarship: articles 
engaging disciplines usually from the social sciences or humanities. Judge Posner 
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(Robert Frodemen et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
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termed this “nondoctrinal scholarship.”235 For each category, would conversion to a 
traditional peer review make a vital difference in the quality of legal scholarship?  
For all the brickbats tossed at law reviews, the answer regarding the first category 
appears to be no. Student law review editors are effective in evaluating doctrinal 
submissions.236  As Judge Posner said of them: “Adept, albeit apprentice, doctrinalists, 
they could write, select, improve, and edit doctrinal scholarship.”237  
For the second category, nondoctrinal scholarship, his answer was less 
encouraging. “Few student editors, certainly not enough to go around,” Posner wrote, 
“are competent to evaluate nondoctrinal scholarship.”238 He elaborated: 
How baffling must seem the task of choosing among articles 
belonging to disparate genres – a doctrinal article on election of 
remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code, a narrative of slave 
revolts in the antebellum South, a Bayesian analysis of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, an angry polemic against pornography, a 
mathematical model of out-of-court settlement, an application of 
Wittgenstein to Article 2 of the UCC, an essay on normativity, a 
comparison of me to Kafka, and so on without end.239  
This passage illustrates how daunting manuscript selection can be for a student 
editor when nondoctrinal articles are added to the mix. But Posner’s argument proves 
too much. A faculty editor would also lack expertise sufficient to evaluate all of the 
interdisciplinary articles included in Posner’s list. He or she certainly could not rank 
them in importance. Student editors and faculty editors share the problem.240 
Judge Posner suggested that student-edited law reviews should largely avoid 
publishing nondoctrinal articles.241 Those of us who believe that interdisciplinary 
work is vital to the future of legal scholarship might ask: Where else could 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship be published? Interdisciplinary journals242 and 
 
235 Id. at 1133. He offered a list: “The principal nondoctrinal subfields of law are economic 
analysis of law, critical legal studies, law and literature, feminist jurisprudence, law and 
philosophy, law and society, law and political theory, critical race theory, gay and lesbian legal 
studies, and postmodernist legal studies.” 
236 Natalie C. Cotton, Note, The Competence of Students as Editors of Law Reviews: A 
Response to Judge Posner, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 951, 958 (2006).  
237 Posner, supra note 146, at 1132. 
238 Id. at 1133. 
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240 The solution for each might be peer review. There is nothing to prevent student law-review 
editors from using peer review in exceptional circumstances. Posner recommended that the 
nondoctrinal manuscripts that law reviews did accept should be sent out for review by “one or 
preferably two scholars who specialize in the field to which the submission purports to 
contribute.” Id. at 1136. Some student law reviews appear to be utilizing this option. See 
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peer-reviewed law reviews243 offer some opportunities, but they are too few in number 
and too specialized to provide enough access. Publication in journals dedicated to the 
nonlegal discipline would be a theoretical option, but “[h]igher status journals in any 
field are typically those adhering most closely to central orthodoxies.”244 Nonlegal 
journals would probably yield to confirmation bias, rejecting any manuscript that 
tainted the purity of their discipline by synthesizing it with legal analysis.245 In his 
study of bias among peer reviewers, Thomas Chalmers observed: “The true quality of 
interdisciplinary work may be invisible to the eyes of a reviewer loyal to one field. 
Specialists tend to prefer their own approach and some may have difficulty 
appreciating the methods of another discipline.”246 For better or worse, student law 
reviews appear to provide the only unrestricted outlet for interdisciplinary legal 
scholarship.  
Law reviews provide other advantages as well. They are less likely to exhibit 
confirmation bias247 because “one viewpoint can never capture student edited law 
reviews. Every year, the editorial staff completely changes, and every two years the 
entire staff is completely replaced.”248 Unlike peer reviewers, student law review 
editors are not the author’s professional rivals; therefore, they should not be motivated 
to react against the author from conflict of interest. Even if they wanted to, law review 
editors could not delay publication by sitting on an article. This is because the one-at-
a-time restriction used by peer-reviewed academic journals249 does not apply. An 
author is instead free to submit the manuscript to several law reviews simultaneously, 
and usually does so.  
Multiple submissions permitted by law reviews serve to reduce publication delays 
associated with the peer-review process. Since the manuscript will already be under 
consideration elsewhere, a negative response from one law review does not require 
the author to restart the submission process.250 Competition for the manuscript with 
other law reviews also provides an incentive for prompt review.  “[S]tudent edited 
journals – which compete with one another for pieces – are forced to review pieces as 
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rapidly as possible, and have elaborate processes set up to do so.”251 Ronald Rotunda 
has noted that this system “has allowed professors to publish quickly. And it has 
allowed prolific professors to publish even more.”252  
More financial and human resources are available to student law reviews than to 
peer-reviewed academic journals. As long as they continue to be subsidized by their 
law schools, law review publications need not show a profit. The large number of 
students serving as editors or support staff creates little expense because they are, by 
tradition, uncompensated.253 In contrast, peer-reviewed academic journals must often 
cope with tight budget constraints254 and are frequently understaffed.255 Manuscripts 
therefore receive more time and attention at law reviews.256 This benefits articles in 
two ways: the improvement of writing quality and the elimination of reference errors.  
First, the quality of writing should improve. There is often room for improvement. 
Marjorie Garber wrote that “academics have been under attack and under surveillance 
for their bad language for a long time now.”257 Deborah Rhode similarly observed: 
“Too much academic writing is unnecessarily unintelligible.”258 Jargon can infest 
academic writing, making “fairly simple ideas appear complicated, if not 
profound.”259  
Peer reviewers should address writing problems in manuscripts but often seem 
uninterested in doing so. Faculty-edited journal editors are concerned but overworked. 
A lot of poor writing therefore slips through.260 As James Bradley concluded his 
pioneering study, the peer review process “apparently does not encourage careful 
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writing.”261 On the other hand, law review editors are willing and well-positioned to 
improve writing quality in manuscripts.  
To begin with, the fact that student editors do not share the author’s expertise can 
be an advantage. Disciplinary intimates, peer reviewers may be more interested in 
which side the author takes in a debate currently raging in the discipline262 than in the 
quality of the manuscript. As a result, peer reviewers “often attempt to coerce the 
author into compliance with their strictly subjective preferences.”263  
In contrast, a student editor has no axe to grind. Like any good editor, he or she 
cares only about getting out the author’s message, about enabling the author to 
communicate “as clearly, as forcefully, and as gracefully as he [or she] can.”264 
Student editors follow maxims like “[r]igorous formulation need not preclude 
clarity”265 and “difficulty and obscurity are not by definition the same.”266 Author-
editor collaborations can be difficult yet fruitful. Richard Delgado provided an 
illustration. “Like many writers, over the years I have written many sentences that 
were perfectly clear to me, but which other people (in particular, the [law review] 
editors) perversely refused to understand.” He continued: “Editors would insist that I 
reframe these sentences. I would grudgingly consent, only later realizing that I was 
much better off for the change.”267  
The greater time and attention that law reviews give to manuscripts produce a 
second benefit: virtually all reference errors (quotation errors and erroneous or 
incomplete source citations) are eliminated.268 
Editorial reference checks are “rarely offered by faculty-edited journals.”269 
Resulting error rates in peer-reviewed academic journals have created difficulties for 
readers wishing to retrieve the author’s sources.270 A study of two hundred randomly-
selected references from twenty peer-reviewed articles revealed an error rate of 26%. 
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“Reference accuracy,” concluded the investigators, “continues to be a substantial 
problem.”271  
References in peer-reviewed journals also suffer from imprecision. This occurs 
when the author quotes or refers to a particular part of a work but includes no specific 
page reference,272 only a general citation. Readers must therefore sift through the 
entire source to find the related material – a frustrating imposition for articles and a 
maddening one for books. Such lack of consideration is particularly objectionable 
because the authors had the missing information at hand and could easily have 
provided it. Peer reviewers and their journal editors often appear to tolerate this 
slipshod practice. 
In contrast, teams of law review students go over every reference in an article. 
They track down every source to confirm that (1) quotations are accurate, (2) citations 
are error-free and precise, and (3) the author’s representation or interpretation of the 
source is warranted. Law review students also address mundane but important things 
like spelling and grammar.  
This all improves the quality of articles. It also saves authors from embarrassment. 
Professor Delgado spoke for many of us when he candidly observed: “I personally 
shudder to think of the many mistakes student editors have saved me from over the 
years.”273 
To the extent that the strengths of peer review and law reviews are different, it is 
difficult to balance them precisely. Yet the legal academy appears to overall hold its 
own. Because (1) other forms of peer review prove available to the legal academy, (2) 
peer review contributes less to academic journals than might first appear, and (3) law 
reviews offer countervailing advantages, the peer-review attack fails in the same way 
as the three attacks examined earlier. None establishes a difference between law and 
other disciplines capable of damaging law’s stature as an academic discipline. 
EPILOGUE 
From the standpoint of academic culture, the four attacks also suffer in a more 
profound sense. The discourse they engender is impoverished.  
That is to say, the legal academy supposedly fell short – but short of what? What 
attributes of academic disciplines give them stature and legitimacy? What are their 
common virtues, their defining features? How might such standards best be 
formulated? What results would they produce in application? My view is that an 
attempt to determine whether law (or any other discipline) deserves academic stature 
that does not tackle these questions will be inconclusive.  
Accordingly, I take the questions up in my forthcoming book, Law in the 
Community of Disciplines – Legal Scholarship and University Culture (Edward Elgar 
Publishing). The book will open with an exposition of the same matters explored in 
this Article. Dismissal of the four attacks will serve the book by clearing a path for 
more productive inquiry. 
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